Pitchford v. Cain | 03/31/26 | Docket #: 24-7351
24-7351 PITCHFORD V. CAIN
DECISION BELOW: 126 F.4th 422
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-70009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
District Attorney Doug Evans convicted Terry Pitchford, aged 18 years at the time of the
crime, of capital murder and secured a death verdict in the Grenada Circuit Court before Judge
Joseph Loper on February 9, 2006, with the entirety of jury selection and opening arguments
taking place on February 6.
After direct and collateral reviews in state court, the Northern District of Mississippi
granted habeas corpus relief upon concluding that the trial court failed to determine the
plausibility of the prosecutor
’
s proffered reasons for peremptorily striking four Black venire
members or otherwise consider the full circumstances bearing upon whether Mr. Evans
’
s
reasons for striking any and each of these four venire members was pretextual and in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. In so doing, the District Court ruled the state supreme court
’
s
reliance on its waiver jurisprudence improperly foreclosed consideration of pretext
under
Batson v. Kentucky
, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Judge Loper implicitly made determinations for
each of the four strikes, trial counsel waived argument of pretext, and the Supreme Court of
Mississippi
’
s waiver jurisprudence comports with
Batson.
This opinion in
Pitchford v. Cain
confirmed the Fifth Circuit
’
s disavowal of earlier circuit
jurisprudence recognizing, inter alia, that since
Miller-El v. Dretke
, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (
Miller-El
II
), capital petitioners had been unable to
“
waive[] any
Batson
claim based on a comparison
analysis,
”
Woodward v. Epps
, 580 F.3d 318, 338 (5th Cir. 2009), deepening the Fifth Circuit
’
s
split, joined by two other circuits, with the majority of courts of appeals in the application of
Batson
.
This petition presents the following questions:
1. Does clearly established federal law determined by this Court and applied in six other
circuits require reversal of a state appellate court
’
s denial of relief from a capital prosecutor
’
s
discriminatory exercise of four peremptory strikes against Black venire members wherein the
trial court, for each of the four strikes, failed to determine
“
the plausibility of the reason in light
of all evidence with a bearing on it
”?
Miller-El II
, 545 U.S at
251–52.
2. Does Mississippi Supreme Court precedent, which deems waived on direct review
arguments of pretext not stated in the trial record, defy this Court
’
s clearly established federal
law under
Batson
?
3. Does a finding of waiver on a trial record possessing
Batson
objections, defense
counsel efforts to argue the objection, and the trial court
’
s express assurance the issues were
preserved, constitute an unreasonable determination of facts?
GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER, UNDER THE STANDARDS SET
FORTH IN AEDPA,
28
U. S. C. §
2254
(d), THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT UNREASONABLY
DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REBUT THE PROSECUTOR'S ASSERTED
RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS FOR EXERCISING PEREMPTORY STRIKES AGAINST FOUR BLACK
JURORS.
ORDER OF MARCH
30
,
2026
:
THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED.
CERT. GRANTED 12/15/2025